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Abstract—In digital forensics, data stored in a hard disk usually 
contains valuable evidence. Preserving the integrity of the data in 
the hard disk is a critical issue. A single hash value for the whole 
hard disk is not appropriate as the investigation may take a long 
time and latent sector errors (LSEs) (bad sectors due to media 
imperfection, for example) which cause a sector suddenly 
unreadable will make the hash value inconsistent. On the other 
hand, using a hash per sector may need to store a lot of hash 
values. Previous research has been conducted to use fewer hash 
values, but can resist some of LSEs to decrease the number of 
unverifiable sectors even if there are LSEs. This integrity problem 
is more complicated in the presence of Legal Professional 
Privileged (LPP) data inside a seized hard disk in digital forensic 
as the hard disk has to be cloned once seized and the original hard 
disk will be sealed after cloning. Hash values need to be computed 
during this cloning process. However, the cloned copy will be 
returned to the suspect for the deletion of LPP data before the 
investigator can work on the sanitized copy. Thus, the integrity of 
unmodified sectors has to be verified using the hash values 
computed based on the original hard disk. This paper found that 
existing schemes are not good enough to solve the integrity 
problem in the presence of both LSEs and deletion of LPP data. 
We then propose the idea of a “Dual Cube” hashing scheme to 
solve the problem. The experiments show the proposed scheme 
performs better than the previous schemes and fits easily into the 
digital forensic procedure. 
 
Index Terms—3-Dimension Hashing, Combinatorial Group 
Testing (CGT), Hard Disk Sector Allocation, Latent Sector 
Errors (LSEs), Legal Professional Privilege (LPP)  
I. INTRODUCTION 
ard disk, as a most widely-used data storage, plays an 
important role in digital forensic investigation by 
 
Manuscript received March 14, 2011. The work described in this paper was 
partially supported by the General Research Fund from the Research Grants 
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. 
RGC GRF HKU 713009E), the NSFC/RGC Joint Research Scheme (Project No. 
N_HKU 722/09), and HKU Seed Fundings for Basic Research 200811159155 
and 200911159149. 
Zoe L. Jiang is with the School of Computer Science and Technology, 
Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School, China 
(corresponding author : (86)137-1153-3710; e-mail: zoeljiang@gmail.com). 
Junbin Fang, S. M. Yiu, K. P. Chow and Lucas C. K. Hui are with the 
Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
(e-mails: junbinfang@gmail.com, smyiu@cs.hku.hk, chow@cs.hku.hk, 
hui@cs.hku.hk). 
Long Chen is with the Institute of Computer Science and Technology, 
Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China (e-mail: 
chenlong@cqupt.edu.cn).  
Xiamu Niu is with the Faculty of Computer Science, Harbin Institute of 
Technology, China (e-mail: xiamu.niu@hit.edu.cn).  
providing a huge amount of evidence data. Preserving the 
integrity of evidence data stored in the hard disk is a 
fundamental problem. Otherwise, either the defendant or the 
prosecutor can easily challenge the validity of it. However, 
forensic investigation usually involves a lengthy process and it 
takes time to identify the data inside a huge hard disk that can 
be used as evidence. Thus, a usual technique is to make use of 
hash values (a cryptographic technique [1] that can be used to 
verify if any bit of a piece of digital information has been 
changed).  
Once the hard disk of a suspect is seized, a standard 
procedure [2-4] is to make a clone using a write-blocking 
device and create hash values for the data inside the hard disk 
before any investigation is carried out. The original disk is 
often sealed and investigation will be carried out on the cloned 
copy. After the investigation, the integrity of the evidence 
found in the cloned copy can be verified by computing the hash 
values of the cloned copy and compare it to the previously 
stored hash values. However, simply taking one cryptographic 
hash for the whole hard disk is not appropriate due to the nature 
of hash function that even if one bit inside the whole hard disk 
has corrupted, the hash value of the “damaged” hard disk will 
not be the same as the previously computed hash value, thus the 
integrity of the hard disk cannot be verified and the evidence 
becomes useless. In practice, the hard disk sectors may be 
damaged due to various reasons, such as latent sector errors 
(LSEs) [5]. Another extreme is to create a hash value for each 
sector. This approach will create a lot of hash values, for 
example, for a 250GB hard disk, the number of sectors is over 
480 million. Thus, it is desirable to minimize the number of 
hash values to be stored while increase the chance of 
maintaining the integrity of a sector. Examples of research in 
this direction include 3-D scheme [6], CGT [7], and super-cube 
approach [8, 9]. 
Besides the physical damage to the hard disk that may cause 
the bits in a sector to be changed or result in an unreadable 
sector, the integrity problem in digital forensic is more 
complicated due to the Legal Professional Privilege (LPP). LPP 
in the Common Law is to enable a client who may not have 
enough legal knowledge to fully disclose everything to his legal 
advisor for seeking of advice without worrying that anything 
disclosed for this purpose will be used against him in the court. 
Thus, the defendant has a right to prevent a particular document 
from presenting as evidence against him if it is classified as a 
privileged document [10]. When it is applied to the digital 
world, it is possible that LPP data exists in a seized hard disk in 
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a criminal investigation. The owner of the hard disk has the 
right to refuse any possible leakage of the contents of the LPP 
data. 
A hard disk stores numerous files and information (including 
the logically deleted data). As indicated in [11], in practice, it is 
not feasible to let the owner delete all LPP data before the 
suspicious hard disk is being seized and cloned as it requires 
legal professionals to determine whether a piece of information 
can be possibly classified as LPP data. The investigator would 
also worry that the suspect may purposely erase some evidence 
which is actually non-LPP data. On the other hand, if the 
investigator is allowed to take a cloned copy without the owner 
removing LPP data, there is no guarantee that there is no access 
to the LPP data which may create unfairness to the suspect. 
To answer all the above questions, we need to clearly define 
a legal and technically-feasible procedure and design an 
effective and flexible integrity verification and identification 
scheme for a hard disk when sector change (LSEs or artificial 
modification/deletion such as removing LPP data) is 
unavoidable. As a result, when a suspicious hard disk is seized, 
the procedure can be executed with the permission of the both 
parties (the hard disk owner and the investigator). Whenever 
disputation arises, the hard disk integrity verification and 
identification scheme can be deployed to check the integrity 
and further point out the sectors which affect the integrity so as 
to provide proof for any misbehavior of the owner. 
From the practical point of view in defining the procedure, 
we first need to consider the amount of time and effort required, 
as well as the extra storage and the complexity of the whole 
procedure, such as the requirement of a face-to-face interaction 
between the two parties. Secondly, access to the original hard 
disk should be avoided as much as possible, so as to protect the 
original data from any possible damage. Thirdly but not lastly, 
the procedure should be fair to both parties. Ref. [11] proposed 
a procedure trying to satisfy the above requirements. Roughly 
speaking, the core steps of the procedure are as follow. Once a 
hard disk is seized, the investigator is allowed to make a cloned 
copy using a write-blocking device in front of the 
suspect/owner. Hash values are created during the cloning 
process. The original hard disk is then sealed and the hash 
values stored for later verification. The cloned disk will be 
returned to the owner/suspect. They can spend time to erase the 
data which can be claimed to be LPP related. Data claimed to be 
LPP will be submitted to the court. The sanitized hard disk will 
be give to the investigator for investigation. One of the core 
problems in the procedure is how to verify the integrity of the 
data inside the sanitized hard disk after the LPP data has been 
deleted using the hash values computed from the original hard 
disk. 
Since some sectors will be modified, one single hash value 
for the whole hard disk will not work. Using one hash for each 
sector can solve the problem, but it requires storing many hash 
values. It is desirable to have an intermediate scheme so that the 
number of hash values to be stored can be reduced while trying 
to reduce the failure rate to verify the integrity of a sector even 
if it is not modified. In this paper, we first review and evaluate 
the effectiveness of existing approaches [6, 7] that were 
proposed to solve the LPP integrity problem based on 
simulated LSEs and LPP file deletion. Then, we propose a 
“Dual Cube” hashing scheme which can greatly reduce the 
failure rate of verification of the integrity of an unmodified 
sector while using a lot fewer hash values than the trivial 
approach of storing one hash value per sector. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes some 
related work. Section III provides the evaluation of existing 
approaches based on simulated LSEs and deletion of LPP data. 
From this empirical study, we found that the CGT approach [7] 
is not appropriate for solving the LPP integrity problem since 
the performance of it degrades substantially when the number 
of changed sectors increases no matter whether these changed 
sectors are consecutive or not. In practice, there should be quite 
a lot of LPP data will be erased from the hard disk, thus CGT 
may not be an appropriate solution. On the other hand, based on 
some observations from the empirical study, we propose a 
“Dual Cube” hashing scheme based on the 3-D scheme [6] in 
Section IV that can provide a better solution to solve the LPP 
integrity problem. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Jiang et al. proposed a 3-D hashing scheme to provide strong 
integrity verification function for the hard disks [6]. Instead of 
computing one chained hash value for a whole hard disk, it first 
orders all sectors into a 3-dimensional space to form a solid 
cube (one can imagine the single hash value approach is to 
arrange all sectors in a 1-dimensional space). Then a hash value 
is computed on each sector chain in each of the three 
dimensions. As a result, the integrity of each sector can be 
verified as long as there is no modified/deleted sector on at least 
one of its three hash chains, thus it does not depend on all the 
sectors in the hard disk. However, the design of this scheme 
assumes that any sector becomes bad after some period of time 
with only a small probability and does not consider the case of 
possible artificial modification/deletion, such as LPP data. A 
failure probability Pf depending on the number of actual bad 
sectors is given in the paper.  
Later, Fang et al. tried to provide a better scheme which uses 
fewer hash values and try to identify which sector has been 
changed that causes an unchanged sector not able to be verified.  
The main idea is to group sectors into different subsets using a 
sophisticated grouping algorithms based on some 
Combinatorial Group Testing algorithms [7]. Each group can 
be treated as a hash chain. A hash value is computed for each 
group. The scheme relies on a complicated grouping algorithm 
to form the hash chain, thus the number of hash chains can be 
significantly reduced, however, the performance of the scheme 
deteriorates as the number of modified sectors increases (see 
the details in Section III.C for details).  
Chen et al. proposed the one-error integrity indication code 
to compress the storage of hash values for the integrity 
verification of the data transmitted through network [8]. 
However, it can only indicate one error sector in grouped 
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sectors. To enhance error indication capability, they further 
proposed the grouped one-error integrity indication code using 
super-cube idea [9], which is similar to the 3-D hashing scheme 
[6]. Therefore, it also suffers from the base error amplification 
ratio, which is similar to the measure of Pf in [6]. 
Finally, Ref. [11] tried to apply 3-D scheme to solve the LPP 
integrity problem. However, they assume that somehow the list 
of the sectors (files) to be claimed as LPP data may be known in 
order to create an additional hash chain on those affected 
sectors. This assumption is not valid in all cases. 
III. OBSERVATION ON SECTOR ALLOCATION 
In this section, we try to evaluate the existing approaches 
using simulation based on two types of possible changes in 
sectors: the incident error sectors and artificial erased files (e.g. 
due to LPP data). These two types of changes on sectors would 
affect the performance of designed integrity verification 
schemes. This section discusses the features of two types of 
changes, and evaluates the effect of such changes on two 
existing integrity verification schemes, 3-D and CGT. 
A. Distribution of Latent Sector Errors 
LSEs refer to the incident sector errors that go undetected 
until the corresponding disk sectors are accessed [5]. Any data 
previously stored in the sector is lost. Therefore, it is necessary 
to consider the distribution of such incident LSEs since it is 
unpredictable and may affect the integrity verification of the 
whole hard disk. Here, a list of useful observations from [5] is 
shown. A total of 3.45% of 1.53 million hard disks developed 
LSEs over a period of 32 months. More than 80% of hard disks 
with LSEs have fewer than 50 errors. More importantly, there 
is significant locality in the occurrence of LSEs across logical 
sector addresses, and the hard disks exhibit high temporal 
locality of LSEs, says in “bursty” pattern. Schroeder et al. [12] 
further found that between 20% and 50% of all LSEs are 
located in the first 10% of the hard disk’s logical sector space 
and between 20 to 60% of all errors have a neighbor within a 
distance of less than 10 sectors in logical sector space. 
 --Observation 1. Most of the numbers of LSEs for the hard 
disks are in dozens, whose allocations tend to be near each 
other or even consecutive, and tend to locate in the first part of 
the hard disks’ logical sector space. 
B. Distribution of Word Documents 
Since Word document is a quite common digital format that 
is used by ordinary users frequently, it is a typical and 
important form of LPP data stored on a hard disk. As a 
preliminary work, we explore the allocation of Word 
documents to simulate the features of sector distribution of LPP 
documents. 
Before looking into the details of sector distribution, we give 
an overview on basic structure of a hard disk [13]. Each hard 
disk is equipped with several flat disks called platters, each of 
which has two sides, the top and the bottom, accessed to by the 
two heads, respectively. Each platter is broken into concentric 
circles, tracks, each of which is further broken into sectors, 
which is the smallest physical storage unit (512 bytes per 
sector). In addition to the physical structure, the hard disks also 
provide the logical structure, which is generally named as file 
system. Different systems use different file allocation schemes 
to organize and control access to data on the hard disk. To 
balance the needs of efficient disk use and performance, 
clusters, or allocation units, are used to manage sectors (8 
sectors per cluster in NTFS file system).  
Our experiments are based on tens of the hard disks using 
NTFS file system, whose storage sizes are all 250GB. We 
search for all Word documents with “doc” and “docx” as file 
extension from normal users’ hard disks, and find that on 
average there are about 3000 Word documents on a hard disk 
with an average size of 200K Bytes (i.e. 400 sectors or 50 
clusters). Around 0.4% of all Word documents are further 
divided into several or more fragments, while all others are 
allocated in consecutive sectors/clusters. Note that our 
experiment does not consider those logically deleted Word 
documents which may still be left on the hard disk. According 
to the sector distribution of potential LPP word files, we have 
the following observation. 
 --Observation 2. The deletion of LPP data will affect 
consecutive sectors in the hard disk. The average number of 
consecutive sectors for Word documents of a normal user is 
400. 
C. Comparison of 3-D and CGT with Sectors Erased 
In this subsection, we evaluate the 3-D hashing scheme and 
the CGT-based hashing scheme in the context of forensic 
investigation with possible deletion of LPP files in the presence 
of incident error sectors. We mainly investigate the number of 
affected sectors when there are sectors changed due to the 
random LSEs and the deletion of LPP documents. 
In [14], the reliability of CGT-based hashing scheme with 
Shifted Transversal Design [15] (STD) has been analyzed with 
the number of errors varying from 1 to 10. The previous result 
shows that for a block containing 106 sectors, when the number 
of the error sectors is increased from 1 to 10, about 95% of total 
sectors can still be verified. Here, we increase the number of 
error sectors up to 50, and find that the CGT-based hashing 
scheme is almost useless since all the outcomes of group tests 
are corrupted due to the changed sectors. When a Word 
document containing 400 consecutive sectors is deleted to 
simulate the deletion of a LPP document, the CGT-based 
hashing scheme again cannot identify any normal sector.  
As for 3-D scheme, we use Monte-Carlo method [16] to 
simulate the incident sector errors to investigate the number of 
affected sectors caused by LSEs, and also erase multiple Word 
documents to investigate the performance of the scheme. Note 
that a hard disk of 250GB with 488,392,065 sectors is taken as 
the device under test here. As shown in Figure 1, for the case of 
LSEs, when the number of the error sectors increases from 
1200 to 18000, the average number of the affected sectors 
varies from 3 to 11480 and the curve is getting sharper. It 
means that the more the number of sectors is changed, the more 
the number of sectors in the cube is affected. And the number of 
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affected sectors increases very fast. However, when it turns to 
the case of the deletion of multiple Word documents (to 
simulate the deletion of LPP files), the number of affected 
sectors does not increase as much when the number of deleted 
files increases. Even when the number of deleted sectors for 
LPP files is increased to 18000, the number of the affected 
sectors is only 2362 which is far less than that of the case of 
random LSEs.  
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Figure 1. The number of affected sectors varies with the 
number of deleted sectors 
 
 --Observation 3. When the number of LSEs or the sectors 
of erased LPP documents increase, the performance of the 
CGT-based hashing scheme deteriorates greatly. 
 --Observation 4. When the number of LSEs increases, the 
performance of the 3-D hashing scheme becomes worse and 
worse. However, the decrease in performance is not as serious 
for the case of deletion of LPP files. 
As a summary of the above observations, CGT is not 
appropriate when there are a large number of sectors erased 
from the hard disk, whatever they are consecutive or not. For 
3-D scheme, it is not as bad as CGT and is a good candidate for 
further improvement. In the next section, we propose a “Dual 
Cube” hashing scheme based on the 3-D scheme to reduce the 
number of affected sectors. 
IV. DUAL CUBE HASHING SCHEME 
The section first reviews the modified 3-D hashing scheme 
given in [11], then proposes the “Dual Cube” hashing scheme 
which can greatly enhance the performance of the integrity 
verification scheme by reducing the number of possibly 
affected sectors.  
A. Review of the modified 3-D hashing scheme 
In [6], the 3-D hashing scheme orders all the sectors on a 
hard disk in a 3-dimension pattern. Each sector sm (0 ≤ m ≤ N-1) 
can be uniquely represented by three coordinates, denoted as 
sx,y,z where 1≤ x, y, z≤ N1/3, and N is the total number of sectors 
of the hard disk. 
Instead of computing one hash value for each sector, for each 
fixed (y, z) pair, it forms a hashing chain in X dimension using 
the sectors sx,y,z for all x’s from 1 to N1/3; for each fixed (x, z) 
pair, it forms a hashing chain in Y dimension using the sectors 
sx,y,z for all y’s from 1 to N1/3; for each fixed (x, y) pair, it forms 
a hashing chain in Z dimension using the sectors sx,y,z  for all z’s 
from 1 to N1/3. The size of each chain is N1/3 and one hash value 
is computed for each chain, as follows (see Figure 2). 
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Then, all the hash values will be stored in a secure place for 
later comparison. After some time when the hard disk integrity 
checking is required, all the hash values will be recalculated 
using the same 3-D scheme on the hard disk sectors, then 
compared to the originally stored ones. 
However, the problem of this scheme is that it will fail to 
verify the integrity of a normal sector when there is at least one 
bad sector on each chain to which the normal sector belongs, 
i.e., the normal sector happens to be arranged at the intersection 
of three “corrupted” chains in a cube such that it is tainted. For 
example, in Figure 2, the scheme fails to verify the integrity of 
the sector sx,y,z (a black point) for there is a bad sector si0,j0,k0 (a 
crossed point) with (j0 = y; k0 = z) in X dimension, a bad sector 
si1,j1,k1 (a crossed point) with (i1 = x; k1 = z) in Y dimension, and 
a bad sector si2,j2,k2 (a crossed point) with (j2 = y; k2 = z) in Z 
dimension simultaneously. In the case of LPP documents 
deletion, this problem becomes more serious because a lot of 
sectors are artificially turned into “bad” resulting in more 
affected sectors that will fail the verification. 
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Figure 2. A sample structure of 3-D hashing scheme 
 
In [11], a modified 3-D scheme is proposed to accommodate 
this scheme to the LPP application. The idea is to locate the 
affected sectors, Sf, according to the list of sectors to be deleted, 
Sd, then form these affected sectors as an additional hash chain 
(the dashed line with arrow) such that these sectors can be 
verified separately later. And the authors expect that the 
number of deleted sectors may not be a very big number, as 
well as the number of affected sectors. However, as pointed out 
in the Introduction section, the assumption of knowing which 
sectors to be deleted is not realistic or both the suspect/his legal 
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representative and the forensic investigator have to sit down for 
long hours to go through each file to decide if it is LPP related. 
B. Our proposed “Dual Cube” hashing scheme 
Although the modified 3-D hashing scheme provides a good 
solution to the hard disk integrity checking with LPP 
documents deletion, the performance may deteriorate when the 
number of LPP documents increases. With the increase in the 
number of sectors to be deleted, the number of affected sectors 
also increases rapidly. For example, in our experiments, when 
the number of deleted sectors for LPP documents is increased 
to 120000, the average number of affected sectors becomes 
551036, and exceeds the number of deleted sectors by about 5 
times. In this case, how to check the integrity of the additional 
chain effectively and efficiently becomes another problem in 
addition to other possible problems such as latent sector error, 
hash corruption caused by one bit loss, the cost of computation 
and storage, and etc. [7]. 
Therefore, in our proposed scheme, we try to reduce the 
number of affected sectors to a minimal level by using a “Dual 
Cube” hashing method, such that to avoid the lengthy 
additional chain, even when the number of deleted sectors for 
LPP documents is huge. The idea of “Dual Cube” hashing 
method is as follows. 
HASH VALUES GENERATION: When the investigator 
wants to generate integrity information of the hard disk, the 
procedure of “Dual Cube” hashing scheme is as follows: 
(1) First, as the original 3-D scheme does, the sectors in the 
hard disk will be arranged into a cube according to the normal 
sequence of sectors, which is denoted as SEQ1st = (0, 1, 2, …, 
N-1).  
(2) With this cube, a hash value for every chain in every 
direction for every sector will be computed. Note that there will 
be 3 hash values correlated to every sector, denoted as st
zyVX
1
,
, 
st
zxVY
1
,
 and st
yxVZ
1
,
. After computation, all the hash values will be 
stored securely for further purpose. 
(3) After step (2), the sequence of the sectors will be shuffled 
and a new sequence, denoted as SEQ2nd = (N/2, N/2+1, 
N/2+2, …, N, 0, 1, 2, …, N/2-1) will be generated. Using SEQ2nd, 
the sectors will be rearranged to form a new cube. This 
operation is equivalent to rotating the cube as rotating a 
Rubik’s cube.  
(4) Since now a certain sector in the second cube will have 
three new chains which are different with those in the first cube, 
we need to compute a new set of hash values for the new chains 
for every sector. And the new set of hash values for the sector 
can be denoted as nd
zyVX
2
,
, nd
zxVY
2
,
 and nd
yxVZ
2
,
. These hash values 
will also be stored for integrity verification. 
HASH VALUES VERIFICATION: After deleting LPP 
documents, to verify the integrity of the remaining sectors, the 
investigator can works as follows: 
(1) With SEQ1st = (0, 1, 2, …, N-1), the investigator can 
arrange the sectors into a cube same as the first cube in hash 
values generation stage and compute a set of hash values using 
this cube: '1,
st
zyVX , '
1
,
st
zxVY  and '
1
,
st
yxVZ . 
(2) Comparing the hash values set of '1,
st
zyVX , '
1
,
st
zxVY  and 
'1,
st
yxVZ  with the stored ones, 
st
zyVX
1
,
, st
zxVY
1
,
 and st
yxVZ
1
,
, the 
investigator will identify the sectors as unmodified or not and 
get a collection of sectors which fail in the verification. The 
collection can be denoted as },{ 11 stfd
st
nv SSS = , where dS  denotes 
the sectors deleted for LPP documents, and st
fS
1  denotes the 
sectors affected by the deleted sectors in the first cube. 
(3) Using SEQ2nd, the sectors will be rearranged to form a 
new cube as the second cube in hash values generation stage, 
and the corresponding hash values set of '2,
nd
zyVX , '
2
,
nd
zxVY  and 
'2,
nd
yxVZ will be computed.  
(4) As step (2) does, the investigator compares the hash 
values set of '2,
nd
zyVX , '
2
,
nd
zxVY  and '
2
,
nd
yxVZ  with the stored ones, 
nd
zyVX
2
,
, nd
zxVY
2
,
 and nd
yxVZ
2
,
, and results in a new collection of 
sectors which fail in the verification for the second cube. The 
collection can be denoted as },{ 22 ndfd
nd
nv SSS = , where 
nd
fS
2  
represents the sectors affected by the deleted sectors in the 
second cube. 
(5) Since both collections, },{ 11 stfd
st
nv SSS =  and 
},{ 22 ndfd
nd
nv SSS = , include dS , through comparing these two 
collections, the investigator can locate the intersection point of 
these collections and the intersection will be almost the same as 
Sd except the number of the items in Sd is extremely huge.  
The experimental results for “Dual Cube” hashing method 
versus the original 3-D scheme are shown in Figure 3. The 
capacity of the hard disk under test is 250GB with 488,392,065 
sectors. 3000 Word documents are prepared for this experiment 
and each document occupies 400 continuous sectors in the hard 
disk on average. When the number of deleted sectors for LPP 
documents is increased from 8000 to 120000, the number of 
affected sectors for 3-D scheme is increased from 100 to 
551036 on average, i.e., the number of affected sectors is 
increased 5510 times. At the mean time, the number of affected 
sectors for “Dual Cube” is only about 1000 even there are 
120000 sectors are deleted. This result illustrates that the “Dual 
Cube” method is more reliable in integrity checking at sector 
level than the previous 3-D scheme from the viewpoint of 
practice. 
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Figure 3. The number of affected sectors using “Dual Cube” 
method and that using original 3-D scheme versus the 
increment of the number of deleted sectors. 
C. Mathematical analysis 
In this section, we will try to deduce the probability of a 
normal sector which becomes unverifiable as it is affected by 
Sdn  randomly deleted sectors in the “Dual Cube” scheme, such 
that we can estimate the number of affected sectors.  
(1) At the first step, we try to deduce the probability of a 
normal sector affected by Sdn  randomly deleted sectors in the 
first cube. Assume that there is a hard disk drive containing N 
sectors and we distribute the sectors into a cube. For this cube, 
the length of each dimension should be R=N1/3.  
Instead of calculating the probability of affected sector 
directly, we first calculate the probability for each chain in d1 
dimension which will be affected by the deleted sectors. The 
idea is as follows. If there is only one sector deleted, the 
probability for each chain becomes unverifiable will be 1/N2/3 
because there are totally (N1/3*N1/3) chains in d1 dimension, and 
the probability for each chain remains unaffected will be 
(1-1/N2/3). Therefore, if there are Sdn  independently deleted 
sectors, the probability for each chain remains unaffected will 
be SdnN )/11( 3/2− , and the probability for each chain 
becomes unverifiable will be SdnN )/11(1 3/2−− .  Since 
each sector in the cube will uniquely belong to a certain chain 
in d1 dimension, the probability of a normal sector which will 
become unverifiable in d1 dimension is equivalent to the 
probability for each chain becomes unverifiable due to the 
deleted sectors, denoted as Sdnd Np )/11(1
3/2
1 −−= . 
Similarly, the probability for the other two dimensions can be 
denoted as 
Sdn
d Np )/11(1
3/2
2 −−= and
Sdn
d Np )/11(1
3/2
3 −−= . 
A normal sector in the cube will be affected only when all of 
those three chains become unverifiable due to the deleted 
sectors. Thus, the probability of a sector becomes unverifiable 
will be 
)/1(*** 321 Nnpppp Sddddaf −= , 
where the term )/1( NnSd−  means that the deleted sectors 
should not be count into the group of affected sectors.  
(2) Then we can consider the probability in “Dual Cube” 
scheme. As the second cube will be different with the first one, 
all the three chains correlated to a certain sector will be changed, 
as well as the constraint relationship. Therefore, we get three 
new probabilities: 
Sdnnd
d Np )/11(1
3/22
1 −−= , 
Sdnnd
d Np )/11(1
3/22
2 −−=  and 
Sdnnd
d Np )/11(1
3/22
3 −−=  
 
And the probability of a sector becomes unverifiable in 
“Dual Cube” scheme will be 
)/1(***
***
2
3
2
2
2
1321
Nnpp
ppppp
Sd
nd
d
nd
d
nd
dddd
CubeDual
af
−
=
          
(3) These formula of probabilities can be used to estimate the 
number of affected sectors in 3-D scheme by: 
321
exp ***)( dddSdaf pppnNn −= ,                      
where expafn means the expectation of the number of affected 
sectors. And the number of affected sectors in “Dual Cube” 
scheme will be: 
****
***)(
2
3
2
2
2
1
321
exp
nd
d
nd
d
nd
d
dddSdaf
ppp
pppnNn −=
.  
Figure 4 shows the estimated curve from the formulas and 
the estimated curve fits well with the experimental results. 
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Figure 4. The estimated number of affected sectors using “Dual 
Cube” method and that using original 3-D scheme versus the 
increment of the number of deleted sectors. 
 
D. Enhance accuracy and reliability using multiple cubes 
 
Although we expect that the number of LPP documents, i.e. 
the number of deleted sectors for LPP documents, may not be a 
very big number, it is still possible, especially when the 
capacity of a hard disk is huge and is getting more and more 
huge. If the number of deleted sectors is kept increasing, using 
the “Dual Cube” method will also meet its limitation. In the 
extreme case, if there are too many sectors deleted and the 
number of affected sectors is still large even after the “Dual 
Cube” hashing method is deployed, multiple cubes can be used 
to keep successfully verifying these affected sectors from the 
practical viewpoint. 
For example, in the above experiments, assume that there 
are 600,000 sectors deleted, using the original 3-D hashing 
scheme will cause the failure of verifying 28,294,060 sectors, 
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and the number of affected sectors using “Dual Cube” hashing 
scheme is still 1,675,031. In this case, deploying a third cube as 
a complement is a feasible solution to further reduce the 
number. In our experiment, the number of affected sectors 
under this test is only 103,147. Multiple cubes may be used to 
handle the case if more sectors are expected to be deleted. Of 
course, there will be a trade-off on the number of hash values to 
be stored. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper evaluates the existing hashing methods proposed 
for solving the LPP integrity problem based on two types of 
changes in the sectors: incident error sectors and deletion of 
LPP files. The evaluation results found that the 3-D scheme is 
acceptable while the CGT-based scheme is not good enough. 
Then, we proposed the “Dual Cube” hashing scheme which can 
achieve better performance. The scheme was also analyzed 
theoretically for random sector errors. As one of the future 
research directions to the problem, we would conduct a 
theoretical analysis on this scheme for LPP sector deletion. 
More comprehensive experiments should be carried to 
understand the sector distribution of LPP data in order to design 
a better scheme.  A better scheme which uses fewer hash values 
with fewer affected sectors is always desirable. The proposed 
methodology is being used by a law enforcement department in 
some real cases. The result will be reported in the full paper. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] F. Yu, Y. Lei, Y. Wang, and Z. Lu, “Robust Image Hashing Based on 
Statistical Invariance of DCT Coefficients,” Journal of Information 
Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, vol. 1, pp. 286-291, 2010. 
[2] Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) - Good practice guide for 
computer based electronic evidence, (http://www.dataclinic.co.uk/ACPO 
Guide v3.0.pdf); accessed on 31st January, 2008. 
[3] Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual, International Competition Network, 
April 2006, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conferen
ce_5th_capetown_2006/DigitalEvidenceGathering.pdf; accessed on 30th 
January, 2008.  
[4] K. P. Chow, C. F. Chong, K. Y. Lai, L. C. K. Hui, K. H. Pun, W. W. Tsang, 
and H. W. Chan, “Digital evidence search kit,” in Proc. of the First 
International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic 
Engineering (SADFE’05), 2005, pp. 187-194. 
[5] L. N. Bairavasundaram, G. R. Goodson, S. Pasupathy, and J. Schindler, 
“An Analysis of Latent Sector Errors in Disk Drives,” in 
SIGMETRICS’07, San Diego, California, USA, June 12–16, 2007, pp. 
289-300. 
[6] Z. L. Jiang, L. C. K. Hui, and S. M. Yiu, “Analysis of K-Dimension 
Hashing Scheme to Improve Disk Sector Integrity,” in Proc. of the 4th 
Annual IFIP WG 11.9 International Conference on Digital Forensics 
(ICDF 2008), 2008, pp. 33-44. 
[7] J. Fang, Z. L. Jiang, S. M. Yiu, and L. C. K. Hui, “Hard Disk Integrity 
Check by Hashing with Combinatorial Group Testing,” in Proc. of the 
2nd International Computer Science and its applications, 2009 (CSA 09), 
10-12 Dec., 2009, pp. 1-6. 
[8] L. Chen and G. Y. Wang, “An Integrity Check Method for Fine-Grained 
Data,” Journal of Software, 20(4), 2009, pp. 902-909. 
[9] L. Chen, X. L. Fang and G. Y. Wang, “One Error Integrity Indication 
Codes and Performance Analysis,” Computer Science, 36(6), 2009, pp. 
97-100. 
[10] P. E. Nygh, P. Butt, Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, 
Sydney: Butterworths, 1997. 
[11] F. Y. W. Law, P. K. Y. Lai, Z. L. Jiang, R. S. C. Ieong, M. Y. K. Kwan, K. 
P. Chow, L. C. K. Hui, and S. M. Yiu, “Protecting digital legal 
professional privilege (LPP) data,” in Proc. of the 3rd International 
Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering 
(IEEE/SADFE-2008), 2008, pp. 91-101. 
[12] B. Schroeder, S. Damouras and P. Gill, “Understanding Latent Sector 
Errors and How to Protect Against Them,” ACM Transactions on Storage, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2010, pp. 9:1-9:23. 
[13] C. M. Kozierok, “The PC Guide,” 2001. Available:  
http://www.pcguide.com. 
[14] J. Fang, Z. L. Jiang, S.M. Yiu, Lucas C.K. Hui, “Checking key integrity 
efficiently for high-speed quantum key distribution using combinatorial 
group testing,” Optics Communications, 284(3), 2011, pp. 531-535. 
doi:10.1016/j.optcom.2010.08.066. 
[15] N. Thierry-Mieg, “A new pooling strategy for high throughput screening: 
the shifted transversal design,” Bmc Bioinformatics, 7, 2006, pp. 13. 
[16] N. Metropolis, S. Ulam, “The Monte Carlo Method,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 44(247), 1949, pp. 335-341. 
doi:10.2307/2280232 
 
